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LEGISLATIVE NOTE
NEW YORK SPECIOUS CASH SALES ACT
1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

The New York Legislature recently moved to protect consumers in that state from unscrupulous retailers of consumer
goods and financers of consumer loans by enacting the Specious
Cash Sales Act.1 The new law is the third in a series of measures
designed to remedy certain perceived inequities to which the
holder in due course doctrine 2 gives rise in the consumer goods
field.
Earlier this year, the Legislature undercut complicated mechanisms whereby a finance company could procure from a retailer
contracts and obligations containing a waiver-of-defenses provision executed by the buyer-consumerP This law in turn complemented a still earlier statute which stripped assignees of consumer paper of their status as holders in due course. 4 As a result
of these two laws, in a suit brought by an assignee of consumer
paper against the consumer-buyer, the consumer can assert
against the assignee any defenses he has against the original
retailer (including failure of consideration and breach of warranty). The intended result was to force finance companies to
investigate their sources of credit with an eye toward accepting
paper only from those who were reputable and solvent.
Certain finance companies, however, were indefatigable in their
search for legal loopholes. 5 Seeking to avoid consumer defenses,
'N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 252-255 (McKinney's Session Law News of New York No.
5, Ch. 605 (1971)), [hereinafter cited as Specious Cash Sales Act by section numbers:
§§ 252-255]. The Act, which became effective September 1, 1971, is set out in full in the
Appendix.
2 An assignee of negotiable paper can become a holder in due course by fulfilling certain
requirements. As a holder in due course, the assignee takes the note free of most defenses
the maker may have against the assignor. (Failure of consideration, breach of warranty,
and fraud in the inducement are some of the most important consumer defenses which are
ineffectual against a holder in due course.)
3N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 403.3(a) (McKinney 1970 Supp.) makes waiver-of-defense
clauses in retail installment transactions unenforceable. Under the old law a creditor had to
give the consumer notice of any assignment. The consumer then had ten days in which to
offer defenses; if no defenses were offered, the waiver-of-defenses provision became
effective.
4 N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 403.6 (McKinney 1970 Supp.).
5
See e.g., N.Y. Times, Aug. 19, 1971, at 49, Col. 2.
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they developed the "specious cash sale." Under this arrangement
the retailer does not extend credit to the buyer. Rather, he merely
helps the buyer locate a willing and available creditor, sometimes
by recommendation, frequently by providing the appropriate
forms. Some went so far as to assist the buyer in filling out the
forms. The immediate effect is two separate paper transactions:
(1) a loan by the creditor to the consumer, and (2) a cash sale by
the retailer to the consumer. Thus the procedure technically loses
its identity as a retail credit transaction. Once again the consumer
is left without any product or service related defenses against his
creditor since the latter has only lent him funds with which to
purchase. the defective goods or services.
New York enacted the Specious Cash Sales Act in order to
close this loophole. 6 A similar provision is included in the National Consumer Act (NCA) published by the National Consumer
Law Center. 7 Under the new law the creditor in the specious cash
sale transaction is subject to consumer defenses provided that "he
knowingly participated in or was directly connected with such
consumer sale." 8 This note will critically analyze the necessity of
the enactment of the Specious Cash Sales Act, the adequacy of
the law's coverage, its possible extensions, and its likely economic
impact.
II.

NECESSITY FOR A LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION

TO

THE

SPECIOUS CASH SALE PROBLEM

A. Inadequacy of Ad Hoc JudicialRelief
The need to cope with specious cash sales arises out of the
inadequacy of other statutory provisions and the likely inefficacy
of any judicial solution. A judicial trend in the general direction of
the preservation of consumer defenses in certain similar situations was noted as early as seventeen years ago. 9 Nevertheless,
the trend appears to be proceeding a bit haltingly. 10 To be sure
some courts have intervened on behalf of the consumer to preserve his defenses against an assignee-finance company. 1 The

I See statement by New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller in McKinney's Session
Law News of New York No. 5, A.258 (1971).
7 NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, NATIONAL CONSUMER ACT [First Final Draft,
1970] (hereinafter cited as NCA).
8Specious Cash Sales Act § 253.
9 Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63 YALE L.J. 1057,
1097-98 0954).
10 Professor Kripke, just three years ago, could no longer detect such a trend. Kripke,
Consumer Credit Regulation: A Creditor Oriented Viewpoint, 68 COLUM. L. REv. 445,

469 n. 62 (1968).
" See cases cited in Gilmore, supra note 9, at 1099 n. 123. See also Littlefield,
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question remains, however, whether the reasoning of these decisions lays a groundwork such that consumers can anticipate judicial relief in the specious cash sale context.
The Arkansas Supreme Court offered the first fully articulated
rationale for preserving a consumer's defenses against an assignee-finance company in Commercial Credit Co. v. Childs.12 The
court held that the assignee did not qualify as a holder in due
course because it was so "closely connected" 13 with the entire
transaction that it could not be a good faith and innocent purchaser. Childs, however, was decided before the adoption of the
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), and it is difficult to say precisely what UCC section might be applied to a similar fact situation today. A likely possibility is section 3-302(1)(b), which
requires that an assignee take in good faith 14 in order to be a
holder in due course. Even if the assignee is found to be a holder
in due course, another possibility is section 3-305(2) which subjects to consumer defenses a holder in due course who "dealt"
with the consumer. Some courts have found a constructive agency
relationship between the seller and assignee, thus viewing the
latter as having dealt with the consumer and subject to consumer
0 5
defenses.
The "close-connection" doctrine set forth in Childs and the
provisions of the UCC which arguably support it focus on the
status of the finance company as assignee and holder in due
course. Therefore, it is unlikely that courts will view Childs and
the UCC provisions as a basis for subjecting the finance company
to consumer product-oriented defenses in the specious cash sale
setting where it is ostensibly nothing more than a lender of cash.
Even the most expansive case to date, Unico v. Owen,16 does
not support the notion that consumer defenses may be asserted
against the finance company in a specious cash sale. In Unico the
consumer contracted for the purchase of 140 record albums over
a five year period but the retailer went out of business shortly
Preserving Consumer Defenses: Plugging the Loophole in the New UCCC, 44
N.Y.U.L. REV. 272, 276 n. 9 (1969).
12199 Ark. 1073, 137 S.W.2d 260 (1940) (financer's printed assignment form appeared
on reverse side of the consumer note).
13
1d. at 1077, 137 S.W.2d at 262.
14UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-201(19) [hereinafter cited as UCC] defines "good
faith" as "honesty in fact." Although this has not prevented some courts from applying a
"reasonable commercial standards" test in some egregious situations [see, e.g., Norman v.
World Wide Distributors, Inc., 202 Pa. Super. 53, 57 n. 2, 195 A.2d 115, 117 n. 2 (1963)],
the clear intent seems to call for a subjective test [see Braucher, The Legislative History of
the UCC, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 798, 812 (1958); and Waterbury Savings Bank v. Jaros-

zewski, 238 A.2d 448 (Conn. Cir. Ct. 1967)].
11See cases cited in Gilmore, supra note 9, at 1099 n. 126 and accompanying text.
16Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 405 (1967).
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thereafter. The financer was found to be a partnership formed
expressly for the purpose of financing the seller. The court held
that the financer was too closely connected with the sale to
qualify as a holder in due course 17 and that the waiver-of-defense
clause was void as against public policy.' 8 As in Childs the court
only discussed the holder in due course relationship, which does
not necessarily cover a lender to whom a buyer directly gives a
promissory note. Although extension of the Unico reasoning to
this situation may be possible given past judicial activism in this
area, such an extension would require a substantial leap from
previously announced judicial doctrine.
B. Legislative Solution More Effective
The most important reason for legislative action is efficacy.
Individual debtors do not benefit substantially from case law
developments 19 for few can afford the protracted litigation necessary to take advantage of such gains.2 0 In any event, the legislative branch is better equipped in terms of fact-finding apparatus to
frame a rule of uniform applicability. The New York Legislature,
recognizing its responsiblity to the many citizens involved in
consumer credit transactions, produced the Specious Cash Sales
Act.
III.

ANALYSIS OF THE SPECIOUS CASH SALES ACT

A. Statutory Language
The Specious Cash Sales Act specifically excludes certain consumer transactions from its coverage, 2 to wit: consumer sales
pursuant to article nine2 2 of the personal property law, credit
transactions, consumer sales of personal property or services
which could require the execution of a promissory note pursuant
to section 403 of the Personal Property Law, 23 and transactions
17 Unico arose before New Jersey adopted the UCC. However, the court noted that its
holding was consistent with the Code, which was enacted in New Jersey before the
decision was handed down.
18 UCC § 9- 206(1) essentially leaves the validity of such waiver provisions to the state.
See General Investment Corp. v. Angelini, 58 N.J.396, 278 A.2d 193 (1971), in which the
court held that N.J.REv. STAT. § 12A:9-206 (1962), (UCC § 9- 206), allowed courts to
invalidate waiver of defense clauses in their discretion where such clauses violated pulic
policy.
1'James, Holder in Due Course and Other Prohibitionson Agreements, 26 Bus. LAW.
881,
20 882 (1971).

id.

21 Specious
22

Cash Sales Act § 255.
N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW §§ 301-312. (McKinney's 1968). This is the Motor Vehicle
Retail Installment Act.
23N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 403.2. This section permits a promissory note only where
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involving the purchase of an automobile. However, defining the
relationship between seller and financer was perhaps the most
acute difficulty confronting the draftsmen of the statute. One
author has expressed scepticism as to the possibility of an acceptable definition. 2 4 The Legislature handled the problem by making
the statute applicable "provided that the creditor knowingly par25
ticipaied in or was directly connected with such consumer sale."
Such language includes similar but more exacting criteria than the
26
parallel provision in the NCA.
The ultimate liability of the creditor under this section is limited
to the amount owing to him at the time a defense is successfully
raised 2 7 This is the same ceiling as New York law provides in the
case of assignees of consumer paper. 2 8 It varies, however, from
the parallel NCA section which provides for liability up to the
29
total amount financed.
B. Statutory Interpretations
The use of the phrase "knowingly participated in or ...directly
connected with" 3 0 to describe the seller-financer relationships
covered by the Act presents a major interpretive difficulty. Specious cash sales are in substance identical to other consumer
credit transactions, 3 1 while in form they appear as standard loans
and cash sales. Distinguishing the specious cash sales from the
innocent loan and sale is the problem, and the above language is
crucial to this distinction. Interestingly, the statute does not define
the language; rather, it sets out three fact situations which raise
rebuttable presumptions that the creditor's knowledge or activity
is subsumed by the statutory language. 3 2 Although the NCA
provides for conclusive presumptions of an interlocking of seller
and financer,3 3 the New York Legislature's adoption of rebuttable
presumptions seems only reasonable. The rebuttable presumpthe vendor furnishes goods or services for repairs, improvements or alterations of real
property. However, since the obligation arising may be represented by a promissory note
only after the work is fully completed, there is ample consumer protection without the new

law.
Kripke, supra note 10, at 471 n. 6 and text accompanying.
25Specious Cash Sales Act § 253.
26NCA § 2.407() employs the standard: "[i]f
the creditor participated in or was
24

directly
connected with.
."
27
Specious Cash Sales Act § 253.
28 N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 403.6 (McKinney 1970 Supp.).
29 NCA § 2.407(l).
30 Specious Cash Sales Act § 253.
21 Littlefield, Parties and Transactions Covered By Consumer-Credit Legislation, 8.
B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 463, 468 (1967).
32 Specious Cash Sales Act § 254.
-NCA § 2.407(2).
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tion places upon the financer the burden of showing that the presumed inference is not true. Such a presumption protects the
financer when the financer-seller relationship is not what it appears to be.
The first presumption arises when "the creditor is a person
related to the seller." 34 The statute exhaustively defines "person
related to the seller."'3 5 In the case of the individual seller, the
term covers most persons who are closely related to the seller by
blood or family.3 6 If the seller is not an individual, the term
"person" covers any one whom the seller controls, who controls
the seller, or who is under common control with the seller'a 7 plus
any officer, director or similar functionary, or any spouse or other
relative residing with such individual(s). 38 In addition, the presumption arises if any officer or similar functionary of the creditor
is related to the seller under any of the above provisions. 3 9 In net
effect, these provisions cover all situations in which the creditor
and retailer are in business together, including, incidentally, such
cozy arrangements as the one in Unico.04
The second situation giving rise to a presumption is where "the
seller prepared forms or documents used to evidence or secure
the consumer loan." 41 Third, a presumption arises where "the
creditor supplied forms to the seller which were used by the
'42
consumer to apply for, evidence or secure the consumer loan.
These sections are straightforward and apply to situations where
the financer has an obvious, direct connection with the seller.
It is significant to note that these presumptions in no way limit
the coverage of the Act.A3 Other evidence can be adduced to
prove the requisite creditor-seller relationship. However, a consumer using any other evidence must assume the burden of proof.
C. Statutory Improvement: Some Suggestions
1. Additional Presumptions-Although the New York law is an
important step forward, attention should nonetheless be given to
those aspects of the law that could be augmented or improved.'
For instance, the list of fact situations giving rise to a presumption
34 Specious Cash Sales Act § 254(a).
35 Id. § 252(f).
36 Id. § 252(f)(I)-(4).
37

Id. § 252(g)(I).
§ 252(g)(2).

38 Id.
39

Id. § 252(h).
4050 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 405 (1967), (where the financing corporation was formed, in
large part, to facilitate the seller's operations).
41 Specious Cash Sales Act § 254(b).
42 Id. § 254(c).
43 Id. § 254.
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of the requisite knowledge or activity could easily be expanded.
In particular, several additional presumptions which are included
in the NCA would serve to stengthen the New York Act. 44 In
view of the fact that the Act does contain some NCA language, it
may be assumed that the draftsmen were familiar with the NCA
and intentionally omitted some of the presumptions included
therein.
The statute omits kickbacks from financer to seller from the list
of presumption-raising fact situations. 45 Common sense suggests
that in such a situation the financer and seller are acting collusively; perhaps the Legislature reasoned that this was so obvious as
not to require its inclusion in the Act. But with language as
amenable to different interpretations as that used in this statute,
every possible aid to construction should be given.
Also missing from the statute is any provision making seller's
referral of the buyer to a particular finance company presumptive
evidence of knowing participation. 4 6 Possibly the draftsmen
feared that innocent financers would be unintentionally included,
perhaps by the offhand suggestion of a retailer. 4 7 However, since
the New York law, in contrast to the NCA, 48 provides that these
fact situations merely raise rebuttable presumptions, the financer
could still offer evidence tending to prove that the requisite relationship was in fact lacking. Given that most of the relevant
evidence is readily available to the financer, shifting the burden of
proof in a referral situation would not impose too great a responsibility on him.
Another of the NCA conclusive presumptions arises when
during a one year period a financer makes twenty or more loans
for the purchase of goods from the same seller. 49 Omission of
such a provision from the New York Act is probably wise, for it
would apply to many transactions which are at arm's-length. 50 A
large financer in an urban area could easily account for twenty
such transactions involving several different retailers without the
least collusive involvement. Or the sole source of credit in a
sparsely populated area might find itself in a similar position vis-h44 NCA § 2.407(2).

45 Compare id. § 2.407(2)(f) which makes this evidence sufficient per se to establish the
seller-financer relationship.
46 Id. § 2.407(2)(e) makes this evidence conclusive on the issue.
47 But, see id. § 2.407, Comment 3, which suggests that such referral -is almost invariably by prearrangement.
48 Id. § 2.407(2) lists fact situations meant to be taken as conclusive proof that "the

creditor participated in or was directly connected with" the sale.
49 Id.

§ 2.407(2)(d).
Note, Limitations on Sales Agreements Under the Uniform Consumer Credit Code
and The NationalConsumerAct, 56 IOWA L. REV. 171, 185 (1970).
50
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vis many local retailers. Indeed, one policy reason for preserving
consumer defenses in consumer loan and sale transactions is to
place a burden of investigation on the financer. 5 1 By providing
that frequency of association gives rise to a presumption of collusion this provision might induce the financer to refuse credit
rather than investigate a retailer with whom he has little, if any,
contact.
2. Credit Card Transactions-Although the Act could be
broadened to cover the expansive field of consumer credit transactions involving the use of credit cards, it specifically excludes
credit card transactions from its coverage. 52 In contrast, the NCA
specifically includes these transactions where "the creditor is the
issuer of a credit card which may be used by the consumer in
the consumer sale or lease as a result of a prior agreement between the issuer and the seller or lessee." 53 The primary concern
here is the national multi-purpose credit card business, such as
that carried on under the aegis of Master-Charge and BankAmericard. One commentator suggests that the credit card arrangement is the logical place to begin plugging the specious cash
sale loophole because the credit card company necessarily has
some prior arrangement with those businesses which honor its
card. 54 Other commentators reason that the relationship between
cardholder and issuer is primary in this situation, and an extension
of the law to cover it would make the financer responsible for
sellers with whom he has only the remotest relationship. 55 Obviously, substantial losses by credit card companies on account of
vendor malfeasance would be unacceptable. Since, however, the
card companies and retailers operate under running agreements,
the companies could contractually arrange to pass back any losses
(possibly through the use of repurchase agreements) from transac56
tions resulting in such consumer defenses as unmerchantability.
At most, the only additional burden on the credit card companies
is the burden of investigating the solvency of those retailers which
they authorize to honor their cards. Since credit card companies
exhort consumers to buy where their signs are displayed, 57 ex51James, supra note 19, at 883.
52 Specious

Cash Sales Act § 255.

53 NCA § 2.407(2)(g).
54

Kripke, supra note 10, at 470-71 n. 66.

55 Jordan & Warren, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 68 COLuM. L. REV. 387,

438
(1968).
56
James, supra note

19, at 882, observes that repurchase agreements are already

common in many financial dealings involving assignments of notes.
57 Bergsten, Credit Cards-A Prelude to the Cashless Society. 8 B.C. IND. & COM. L.

REV. 485, 514 n. 128 and accompanying text.
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tending their responsibility to include the quality or, at least,
solvency of the retailer hardly seems unfair.
3. Subsequent Assignment of Consumer Note by LenderThe Act provides in the specious cash sale context a creditor making a consumer loan is subject to all consumer defenses
arising from the related consumer sale. 58 It does not state that any
subsequent assignee of that note would also be subject to those
defenses. This differs from the recently passed New York law on
retail installment contracts, which specifies that any assignee of
the contract is subject to all consumer defenses 5 9 Thus it appears
that assignees of the specious cash sale contracts may qualify as
holders in due course6 0 and thereby attain immunity from consumer defenses.
Lenders who seek to evade the reach of the Specious Cash
Sales Act by resorting to this tactic should meet with little success
in the courts. The purchase money loan and subsequent sale only
appear to be distinct transactions. In substance they are integral
parts of the same consumer credit transaction. Therefore, the
assignee of the note or contract executed by the consumer-buyer
takes subject to all claims and defenses that this buyer would have
61
against the seller.
The courts would reason that the purpose of the Specious Cash
Sales Act was to protect consumers in this hybrid context to the
same extent they were already protected in the retail installment
context. Since a consumer in the latter situation is able to maintain his defenses against a subsequent assignee of his note, 62 it
would follow that a consumer in the specious cash sale context
should also be able to maintain his defenses against subsequent
assignees of the lender. Anticipation of liberal judicial construction, of course, is no excuse for the omission of specific statutory
language going to the subsequent assignee contingency.
IV.

LIKELY ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE
SPECIOUS CASH SALES ACT

A. Availability of Consumer Credit
The potential economic impact of this legislation upon consumer credit is necessarily speculative. As a basis for suggesting
likely results, this note relies upon empirical studies and pre51 Specious Cash Sales Act § 253.
59

N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 403.6 (McKinney 1970 Supp).
"OThey would, of course, have to meet the requirements of UCC § 3-302.
61 N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 403.6 (McKinney Supp. 1970) generally concerns "the
assignee" of a retail installment contract or obligation.
62

Id.
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dictions directed at legislation which eliminated the holder in due
course status and waiver-of-defenses in consumer transactions.
The theory that freeing finance companies from consumer defenses in the holder in due course context is to encourage the free
flow of commercial paper has been attacked by many commentators. 6 3 It is doubtful that the unavailability of defenses
quickens the free flow of consumer paper, because these instruments move equally as fast in states that allow consumer
defenses against holders as in those that do not.6 4 Moreover, since
the New York Act only closes a small loophole in a comprehensive scheme for preserving defenses, it is doubtful that its
further effect on negotiability will seriously impede the availability
of credit.
The most extensive empirical survey, 6 5 however, seems to suggest that legislation along these lines can make credit more
difficult to procure. This study concerned the Connecticut Home
Solicitation Sales Act of 1967.66 Relevant here is the section of
the statute providing that a consumer's obligation may not be
evidenced by a negotiable instrument.6 7 The study showed that
the number of dealers maintaining financing arrangements with
financial institutions was cut in half.6 8 It is, however, difficult to
evaluate this statistic. Approximately one-third of the decrease
may have resulted from one large financer's leaving the market
entirely. 69 In addition, the Connecticut law reached only at-home
solicitation sales. Arguably, a decrease in the number of dealers
able to procure financing may show only that the law effectively
shut fraudulent dealers out of the consumer market.
Another interesting facet of the study is that some bankers
believed that the Connecticut Act covered the specious cash sale
situation whenever the seller referred the buyer to a financer. 70
Nevertheless, only three of sixteen dealers surveyed who had
63 James, supra note 19, at 883 claims the freedom from defenses is "now important
primarily as a means by which disreputable sellers continue to get financing for their
consumer paper." Kripke, supra note 10, at 470 suggests that consumer defenses against a
holder in due course would make a negligible difference to the financers. Littlefield, supra
note 11, at 285, believes that the consumer paper segment has little effect on the commercial paper market in any case.
64 Jordan & Warren, supra note 55, at 436.
65 Comment, A Case Study of the Impact of Consumer Legislation: The Elimination of
Negotiability and the Cooling-Off Period, 78 YALE L.J. 618 (1969). [Hereinafter cited
Yale Study.]
66 CONN, GEN. STAT. § 42- 134 to - 143 (Supp. 1968).
67 Id.
68 Yale Study at 637-638.
69d. at 638.
70 Id. at 626, n. 35.
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used this arrangement were subsequently unable to procure
71
financing in that manner.
B. Lenders and Sellers
The ultimate effect of the Specious Cash Sales Act on finance
companies in New York is likely to be minimal. Since the law is
aimed only at financers engaged in collusive dealings with retailers, it should have no effect on the normal business of these
institutions, especially since they are now subject to consumer
defenses in all legitimate consumer credit transactions. Any increase in investigative activity should be negligible since the only
additional investigation necessitated would be of retailers in
whose activities they knowingly participate or with whom they
72
are directly connected.
The effect on the retailer will be that any arrangement with a
lender premised upon the specious cash sale loophole is apt to be
terminated unless the retailer can convince the lender of his
solvency, the quality of his products or services, and his willingness to assume responsibility for any obligation subject to product-oriented defenses. 7 3 Since most of the reputable merchants
now using the specious-sale procedure can probably meet these
requirements, hopefully only the disreputable few will go out of
business.
C. Consumers
In terms of the Act's likely economic impact, buyers stand to
be affected indirectly. Those disreputable sellers using the specious-cash loophole to make fraudulent sales will lose their share
of the market. If the more stringent regulations make credit more
expensive, the cost no doubt will be passed on to consumers.
Note, however, that once the policy decision has been made to
cut off holder in due course immunity and waiver-of-defenses
from consumer transactions, 74 plugging this last apparent loophole
with the Specious Cash Sales Act logically completes the legal
package and at minimal cost.
Id.
Schuhman, Consumer Credit by Adhesion Contracts Ii, 35 TEMPLE L. REV. 281, 294
(1962); Yale Study at 640-4 1; Note: Limitations on Sales Agreements Under the Uniform
Consumer Credit Code and the National Consumer Act, 56 IOWA L. REV. 171, 186
71

72

(1970).
73 This, of course, means lenders will acquire additional investigative costs. Even if the
original costs of investigation resulting from the laws eliminating holders in due course and
waivers of defenses in New York may have raised credit costs, the instant law probably
involves only minimal additional costs.
74 Yale Study at 656.
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V. CONCLUSION

The New York Specious Cash Sales Law guarantees the preservation of consumer defenses against financing institutions in
consumer transactions. Unfortunately, given the possibility that
other states may enact such legislation, , the proposed Uniform
Consumer Credit Code (UCCC)75 contains no such provision.
Though this defect in the UCCC has been noted, 76 no remedial
action has been taken. Any state considering adoption of the
UCCC as part of a comprehensive consumer protection package
must adopt a provision similar to the New York Specious Cash
Sales Act or the NCA § 2.407. Hopefully, this note has offered
some suggestions as to the comparative strengths and weaknesses
of the individual provisions in these acts.
-Craig D. Holleman

75 A Final Draft of the UCCC was approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws on July 30, 1968 and by the American Bar Association on
August 7, 1968.
76 Littlefield, supra note 1I.
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APPENDIX

Specious Cash Sales Act
Sec. 252. Definitions. For purposes of this article:
(a) The term "consumer" means an individual.
(b) The term "creditor" means a person regularly engaged in
the business of making loans.
(c) The term "seller" means a person who sells or agrees to sell
personal property or furnishes or renders or agrees to furnish or
render services.
(d) The term "consumer loan" means a loan of money by a
creditor to a consumer for which the consumer's obligation is
payable in installments or for which a finance or other charge is or
may be imposed.
(e) The term "consumer sale" means a sale by a seller to a
consumer of personal property or services for personal, family or
household purposes.
(f) The term "person related to the seller" means with respect
to an individual seller:
(1) the spouse of the seller;
(2) a brother, brother-in-law, sister or sister-in-law of the
seller;
(3) an ancestor or lineal descendant of the seller or his
spouse; and
(4) any other relative, by blood or marriage of the seller or
his spouse who shares a residence with the seller.
(g) The term "person related to the seller" means with respect
to any other seller:
(1) a person directly or indirectly controlling, controlled by
or under common control with the seller;
(2) an officer or director of the seller, or a person performing similar functions with respect to the seller; the
spouse of any such person; and any other relative by blood
or marriage of any such person who shares a residence
with such person.
(h) A creditor who is not an individual shall be a "person
related to the seller" if an officer of the creditor or a person
performing similar functions, whose duties include participation in
or supervision over the consumer loan the proceeds of which
were primarily used in the consumer sale, is a person related to
the seller under (f) and (g) of this section.
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Sec. 253. Consumer defenses. A creditor, who made a consumer loan the proceeds of which were primarily used in a consumer sale, shall be subject to all of the defenses of a consumer
arising from such consumer sale, provided that the creditor
knowingly participated in or was directly connected with such
consumer sale. The creditor's liability under this article shall not
exceed the amount owing to the creditor at the time the defenses
of the consumer are asserted against the creditor. Rights of the
consumer under this article can only be asserted as a matter of
defense to or set-off against a claim by the creditor. The creditor
shall be subrogated to the rights of the consumer arising from the
consumer sale and shall have recourse against the seller to the
extent of any liability incurred by the creditor pursuant to this
article.
Sec. 254. Creditor relationship. Without limiting the scope
of section two hundred fifty-three [ 6302], there shall be a rebuttable presumption that the creditor shall have knowingly participated in or shall have been directly connected with a consumer
sale if:
(a) the creditor is a person related to the seller; or
(b)-the seller prepared forms or documents used to evidence or
secure the consumer loan; or
(c) the creditor supplied forms to the seller which were used to
evidence or secure the consumer loan; or
(d) the creditor. supplied forms to the seller which were used by
the consumer to apply for, evidence or secure the consumer loan.
Sec. 255 [Exceptions.] The provisions of this article shall
not apply to consumer sales made pursuant to article nine [ 6059
et seq.] of the personal property law, credit card transactions,
consumer sales of personal property or services which could
require or entail the execution of a promissory note pursuant to
section four hundred three [ 6016] of the personal property law,
or transactions involving the purchase of an automobile.

